The social stratification systems of major cities are transforming all around the globe.
has received empirical support in a number of other cities such as The Randstad, New York, Paris, [Hong Kong], Singapore and Cape Town." (Hamnett, 2015: 240) . In the context of this middle-class expansion thesis, the changing social stratification of major cities can be described as an "ongoing trend towards social upgrading …, a process in turn partly fueled by an expansion of the middle classes within the city to incorporate greater numbers from lower professional and intermediate non-manual groups" (Cunningham & Savage, 2017: 26) . A third thesis takes the role of the state and the capacity of cities to govern economic and social structural transformations into account. It stresses the continued significance of welfare and redistributive policies, and labour market and educational programmes, at the local and regional levels. European cities have retained distinctive governance features and relatively low levels of social and spatial inequalities (Le Galès, 2002; Musterd & Ostendorf, 2013) .
The present paper is intended to contribute to this debate by focusing on migrant middle classes and exploring why middle-class migrants have declined. This issue has not been addressed in the international literature using a systematic empirical analysis of large scale datasets. Several studies highlight the need for further research into the relationship between increasing immigration and ongoing changes in urban social stratification (e.g., Bailey, van Gent, & Musterd, 2017; Hamnett, 2015; May et al., 2007; Sassen, 1991; Watt, 2008) . 1 To this end, we make exemplary use of a dataset on the living conditions of the Viennese population in 2003 and 2013. 2 This dataset is representative of the city's population. It includes a large sample of people from migrant backgrounds (N = 4,500) displaying multiple characteristics (e.g., nationality and language skills). Regression and decomposition analyses are applied to examine the dataset. The focus is, first, on the significance of migration-specific characteristics for stratification (e.g., national origin) and on whether the decline of middle class migrants may be explained by changing migration flows and a resulting variation in the composition of the migrant population. Second, we examine changing education-and employment-related factors in order to capture their impact on the transformation of social stratification.
Vienna, as an important European metropolis, provides a rewarding case study. First, a structural change from the industrial to the service-based society has become particularly visible in this city.
Currently, 7% of gainfully employed persons are in the industrial sector and income differences are increasingly marked (Görgl, Helbich, Matznetter, & Fassmann, 2011) . Second, Vienna has experienced strong population growth over the past two decades due to new forms of immigration. As of January 1, 2017, almost half of the city's population has migrant backgrounds (Manolakos, Luger, & Boztepe, 2017) . 3 Thirdly, the relatively stable stratification structure on the national level in Austria is not mirrored in Vienna (Hatz, Kohlbacher, & Reeger, 2016) . Although internationally, Austria is virtually considered a "stronghold of stability"; the middle class share in Vienna has shrunk. These developments hint towards "subsurface" dynamics that have been given little attention in the international research to date.
| THE TRANSFORMATION OF URBAN SOCIAL STRATIFICATION: KEY ARGUMENTS AND SOCIOSPATIAL CONTEXT FOR THE CITY OF VIENNA
In urban research, most studies that address questions of the transformation of social structures in cities apply data and analytical concepts which focus on the changing occupational structure in a neo-Weberian sense (e.g., Boterman, Manting, & Musterd, 2018; Butler et al., 2008; Cunningham & Savage, 2017; Hamnett, 2015; Sassen, 1991; Savage et al., 2013) . 4 Most adopt the "Constant Flux" concept (Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992 ) and omit those not employed (e.g., retirees, nonemployed mothers and fathers, and unemployed persons). Depending on regions/countries, this may omit 30% to 35% of the adult population. Moreover, such a conceptualisation of social stratification obscures the structure of inequality at the household level. This is typically shaped not only by one or two earners' incomes but also by welfare state interventions, private transfers between households, and the numbers of persons living in households (Atkinson & Brandolini, 2011; Western, Bloome, & Percheski, 2008) . The opportunities for an individual to access all income resources of the household are crucial for that individual's position in a given society (Mau & Verwiebe, 2010: 196) . Investigations of the transformation of urban social stratification at the level of household income may then consider that household homogeneity is increasingly due to women's rising employment rates and educational aspirations (Breen, Luijkx, Müller, & Pollak, 2009; Kenworthy & Pontusson, 2005) .
With a view on Vienna, the following sections present various operationalisations of urban social stratification. Table 1 on the shifts in occupational classes within the past 20 years not only confirms the findings of other studies but also shows that social stratification has its own dynamics in Vienna. As in many major cities, the class of professionals and managers has expanded substantially over the past two decades. 5 This is similar to the trends reported 1 Tai (2006 Tai ( : 1753 argues, for example, that "social polarisation in Singapore, Hong Kong and Taipei occurs primarily in the external migrant labour market rather than in the internal social structure [of the native population]." Similarly, Watt (2008: 209) argues with regard to the lower social classes of London that these "fractions include a new migrant 'reserve army of labour' doing many of the city's socially invisible, often 'dirty jobs' (cleaning, caring, etc.) ; alongside white and established Black and Asian groups who intermit over time between routine employment (manual and non-manual) and various forms of nonemployment."
2 In a contextualising approach, we also applied EU-SILC and Austrian
Microcensus data for the period of the last two decades.
3 The figures on the sectoral mix and immigration are based on the Austrian
Microcensus (authors' calculations).
4 A well-integrated middle class is seen as a substantial feature of European societies (Mau & Verwiebe, 2010: 39) . The middle class stands for steadily earned incomes, civic involvement, sound family relationships, and social participation. The expansion of this societal segment was inextricably linked to the economic upturn after World War II, with the development of the welfare state and educational system, a process of democratisation, and the establishment of civil society in Europe. However, social stratification research repeatedly shows that in many countries, the middle class has come under increasing pressure over the past years (Foster & Wolfson, 2010; Massari, Pittau, & Zelli, 2009; Whelan, Russell, & Maître, 2016) that corresponds with substantial changes of the stratification system and increasing social inequality (Alderson, Beckfield, & Nielsen, 2005; Atkinson & Brandolini, 2011) .
5 Average gross monthly wages in that class have increased as well (from € 3,500
in 2004 to € 4,600 in 2016; EU-SILC, own calculations).
by Butler et al. (2008) and Hamnett (2015) for London. However, the share of jobs in middle-class positions has decreased over time from 53.1% to 39.5%. This is especially due to a substantial decline in qualified white-collar workers (1996: 17.6%; 2017: 9.1%) and manual workers 6 (1996: 19.7%; 2017: 11.6%) in the Viennese labour market.
Correspondingly, employment in lower-class jobs grew from 23.5% in 1996 to 27.5% in 2017, mainly due to a massive increase in routine service and sales jobs. Unqualified manual jobs declined as deindustrialisation continued. 7 It is important to note that the dynamics of social stratification vary substantially between natives and migrants (Tai, 2006; Watt, 2008) The spatial dynamics of changing social stratification (Boterman et al., 2018; Davidson & Wyly, 2012) in Vienna corresponds with the trends described above. = 25,325 (1996) , N = 23,806 (2003) throughout the city, irrespective of housing types. By contrast, there seems to be spatial mobility among middle class Austrians: moving from smaller apartments, constructed after World War I and II, to single-family housing at the Western periphery of the city.
Against this background, we want to analyse why middle migrants have declined in Vienna. For the empirical analysis we include all individuals (including those not integrated in the labour market) and welfare transfers and household composition data. We also use income distribution data based on equivalised household incomes (Atkinson & Brandolini, 2011) and include results from an analysis of changes in the Viennese occupational structure in order to substantiate our findings.
| CHANGING SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN VIENNA: POTENTIAL CAUSES OF DECLINE FOR THE MIGRANT MIDDLE CLASS
The share of the middle class in Vienna has substantially shrunk over the last two decades (regardless of the operationalisation of class affiliation). Theoretical considerations to explain this decline typically refer to migration-specific, education-and employment-related factors Note. Source: EU-SILC, own calculations (weighted data); N = 13,049 (2016), N = 11,550 (2004); stratification calculated on basis of national median incomes (equivalised household incomes). For instance, respondents belong to the middle class if they earn 80% to 140% of the national median income.
FIGURE 1 Shrinking of migrant middle class in urban areas (Barone & van de Werfhorst, 2011; Boterman et al., 2018; Hamnett, 2015; Zimmermann, 2005 (Watt, 2008; Zimmermann, 2005) . Likewise, the discontinuation of legal obstacles, such as by acquiring citizenship, is considered to facilitate participation in the labour market (Kogan, 2003) and to ensure full access to welfare benefits (Lohmann, 2009) . For these reasons, the second generation-migrants' children raised in Vienna-is expected to be less frequently affected by social decline: an assumption which we will test empirically. Second generation migrants generally hold Austrian educational qualifications that provide favourable labour market positioning due to close connections between the training/educational systems and the labour market.
The migrants' countries of origin are equally relevant. The city's population has grown since the 1990s due to increasing immigration.
Initially, such growth was driven by migrants from ex-Yugoslavia and (Barone & van de Werfhorst, 2011) . As social positions are often "inherited" in Austria, education may offer migrants' children the only opportunity to enter a higher social class than their parents (Chiswick & DebBurman, 2004) . 10 International research has also shown that it is essential for migrants to acquire the language of their destination country. Communicative deficiencies impede the application of otherwise available human capital (Esser, 2004; Guo, 2013; Ours & Veenman, 2003) .
In addition, the arrival of well trained new (EU) migrants has resulted in a crowding out effect on earlier generations of less qualified immigrant workers (Manolakos et al., 2017) . Similarly, the social and economic situation of migrants from the guest-worker generation has deteriorated. This leads us to another key assumption. The decline of middle class migrants has also been impacted upon by employmentrelated factors (McKernan & Ratcliffe, 2005) .
Employment intensity (the extent of gainful employment), occupational positioning, and industry affiliation play important roles. The guest workers of the 1960s and 1970s, as well as lowly skilled first generation migrants in more recent years, are no longer employed in comparably well paid industrial jobs in Vienna (Manolakos et al., 2017) . They more frequently find themselves in simple, poorly paid services or in sectors marked by stagnating real wages (e.g., in the hotel and restaurant industry; see also Table 1 EU-SILC, the applied data on Vienna includes such characteristics as national origin, citizenship, naturalisation, and language skills (for a sample description, see S1, Table A .1).
9 Other key dimensions are controlled for in the empirical analyses as well (Section 5).
10 Furthermore, lacking recognition to be granted with regard to educational levels achieved in their countries of origin makes it difficult for the first generation to utilise their own human capital. Yet even though migrants with higher levels of education still face lower risks of poverty and social decline than migrants with lower levels of education, education protects migrants less effectively from poverty than people without migrant backgrounds (Goebel, Grabka, & Schröder, 2015; Guo, 2013) .
11
Differences are pronounced between occupational groups and lines of business in Austria. In particular, services in restaurants and hotels as well as in trade are characterised by low-wage employment. For instance, average gross hourly wages amount to almost € 20 in manufacturing but less than € 12 in hospitality or trade (EU-SILC 2016, authors' calculations).
12
Life and Quality of Life in Vienna (LLQW 2003) and Basic Social Science Research for Vienna (SOWI 2013).
13
For example, in 2013, the middle class comprised 32% (EU-SILC: 30%), and the lower middle and lower classes comprised 21% and 38%, respectively (EU-SILC: 21% and 36%, respectively).
We applied a well-established concept to measure class affiliation within the income distribution (Atkinson & Brandolini, 2011 (1 = very good, to 5 = don't speak/write German). The answers were combined to categorise language skills as (a) very good in writing and orally, (b) good in writing and orally (average 1.5 to 2.5), and (c) fair to poor (average above 2.5). Employment intensity was captured as either full-time or part-time (more/less than 36 hours a week). Nonemployed respondents included unemployed individuals, retirees, recipients of education (trainees, pupils, students), and others (those on leave, househusbands/−wives, etc.). Occupational status categorised freelancers, self-employed individuals, low-rank and middle-rank employees, highly qualified employees, and skilled and unskilled manual workers. Industry affiliation included (a) fishing, agriculture, and forestry, (b) trade (reference category), (c) hospitality industry, (d) financial and economically oriented services, (e) public administration, education, social services, (f) other service activities, (g) manufacturing, (h) information and communication, and (i) electricity, water supply, and construction.
| Analytical strategy and methods
Various logistic and multinomial regression models were estimated to explain affiliation with the middle class as well as lower and upper classes. The tables in Section 5 present average marginal effects resulting from these models, as these are most likely to be comparable across different models (Best & Wolf, 2012) .
The difference between migrants' class affiliations in 2003 and 2013 was initially examined using a pooled sample of both datasets.
This model first included a binary variable to capture the difference between 2003 and 2013 (Model A1). Migration-specific and other characteristics were then included in the Models A2 to A4. The KHB method proposed by Karlson, Holm, and Breen (2012) was used to test whether the established difference changed across the models. 14 Finally, one's position within the stratification system was with the overall sample of 2013 in order to analyse differences between natives and migrants while using further independent variables (language skills, industry affiliation) exclusively retrieved in 2013. Here, as well, binomial models were drawn upon. 15 In a first step, differences between natives and first-and second-generation migrants were investigated (Model B1). Then, the KHB method was employed to investigate whether the established differences would lessen once other migration-specific and other characteristics were included in Models B2-B4 (including gender, age, and family status). A set of other relevant findings were also evident: The likelihood of being affiliated with lower income groups was lower among second-
| RESULTS: EXPLAINING THE SHRINKING OF THE MIGRANT MIDDLE CLASS IN VIENNA

14
In order to avoid difficulties due to unobserved variation, we followed the recommendation of Hoetker (2007) and tested the relationships between two coefficients rather than single coefficients.
15
This aggregation was considered to be sensible in view of the size of the sample, especially in an effort to avoid estimation problems with regard to affiliation with upper classes. For example, the sample contains no unemployed migrants affiliated with the two upper classes compared. 16 Applying the KHB method, a test showed that the corresponding coefficients (2003/2013) in Models A1 and A2 were significantly different both in terms of affiliation with lower classes (b = −0.09; z = −2.99; p < 0.01) and with upper classes (b = 0.07; z = 2.87; p < 0.01) as compared with the middle class, respectively. No such statistically significant differences were identified between Model A2 and Models A3 or A4. generation migrants, especially natural-born citizens, thus corroborating our initial assumptions and the findings from other studies (Crul, Schneider, & Lelie, 2012; Kristen & Granato, 2007) . Country of origin was a crucial factor in determining class and no difference was observed between the first and the second generation (cf. Model A1 and A2).
17
Those from a Turkish migrant background were often allocated to the lower classes, whereas those from the EU-15 were most likely to be affiliated with the upper classes (Verwiebe & Eder, 2006) Model A2 Model A3 Model A4 AME AME AME AME education, employment intensity, occupational status --incl. incl.
family status, gender, age
Note. Source: LLQW 2003, SOWI 2013 (own calculations); N = 3,557. AME: average marginal effect.
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; ****p < 0.001. A4), differences continued to persist. 18 This is a clear indication that migration background per se is a key explanation for the dynamics of social stratification in Vienna.
19 Table 4 applies Model A3, including both migration-specific and education-and employment-related factors, to further examine the social stratification change among migrants. The table presents Our analyses also confirmed that employment intensity is a substantial factor for stratification dynamics, and has gained in importance over 18 As to affiliation with the lower and upper classes, tests (KHB method) yielded several significant differences between the coefficients in Models A2 and A3 and Models A2 and A4.
19 Following Atkinson and Brandolini (2011) , and in order to substantiate our findings, we calculated a number of sensitivity analyses using various other definitions of the middle class in the income distribution. The results confirm our major findings discussed in Table 3 . Note. The binary logistic model shown here reflects multinomial Model A3 (see Table 3 ). The first two columns show average marginal effects (AMEs) for respondents with migrant backgrounds for 2003 and 2013, respectively. An overall test for differences between years indicates that the two presented models differ from each other (LR χ² = 32.53*). The right column gives results of a decomposition analysis. It was conducted employing the method described by Fairlie (2006) and Jann (2006) . The model obtained with the pooled sample was used as base model. In addition, the order of variables was randomised. Ratio tests indicating differences between coefficients in 2003 and 2013: Table 5 summarises the results of other binomial logistic regression models. These models serve to explain the difference between people with and without migrant backgrounds (and between the first and second generations) in 2013. Again, people from migrant backgrounds were more frequently allocated to lower income classes, and especially first generation migrants (Model B1). Differences between people with and without migrant backgrounds can to a limited extent be attributed to differences in education or industry affiliation (cf. Model B1 with Model B2).
22 These differences lessened once these characteristics were controlled for, yet remained statistically significant. 23 The models and tests presented in Table A Decomposition analyses with alternative measures of Viennese social stratification and varying specifications confirm this key finding.
22
Industrial affiliation had consequences, as expected: Unlike employment in trade and the hospitality industry, employment in highly specialised fields, such as financial and other economically oriented services, resulted in markedly improved chances not to be allocated to classes of the income distribution below the middle. The findings corroborated the theoretical argumentation in Section 3.
23
According to tests along the lines of the KHB method, the differences between natives and the first/second generation were not as large in Model A2 as in Model A1 (p < 0.001 in both cases).
24
Other sensitivity analyses, using occupational classes based on the ISCO-classification (Atkinson & Brandolini, 2011; Hamnett, 2015) , confirm our major findings discussed in Table 5 (see S1, Table A.6). Note. All models additionally include a constant term. Models B2 and B3 also control for affiliation with a number of other industries (see text). AME: average marginal effect. Source: SOWI 2013 (own calculations).
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; ****p < 0.001.
occupational status, and trade. 25 The intergenerational differences may thus be explained by these factors.
| CONCLUSION
International research has so far paid relatively little attention to migration as a key dimension of the transformation of the urban stratification system. The present article has addressed this research gap by exploring the decline of migrants from the middle of society in the city of Vienna.
Using a rich data source, we generated a number of important findings which should be related to the three major theses on the transformation of urban social stratification discussed in the theoretical part of our paper.
First, we showed that the stratification structure of the native population is largely stable in Vienna when using data on the household income distribution which includes transfers from the welfare state. This corresponds with a shrinking of the middle class within the occupational stratification for Austrian natives. At the same time, the share of middle class groups has clearly decreased among the migrant population (both within the household income distribution and the occupational class system).
Second, an explanation for Vienna's complex social stratification transformation cannot be based on just one theoretical proposition.
For example, our empirical findings clearly support key assumptions of the polarisation thesis, especially if one focuses on the transformation of migrant stratification. However, a key argument of the middle-class expansion thesis-referring to professionalisation tendencies within the occupational class system of Austrian natives-applies to Vienna as well. We would argue that our findings on social and spatial inequalities support the "role of the state thesis" as well. This is evident from the higher stability of the middle class within the household income distribution and within large scale housing constructed by the municipality.
Third, turning to the micro logic of the transformation of Viennese stratification, our analyses show that not only is migration-specific change responsible for a social decline among those from migrant backgrounds, but so too are developments in education and employment-related factors. Today, most migrants in Vienna are effectively EU citizens who have noticeably higher educational levels than was the case 20 years ago (MA 23, 2017) . Our multivariate analyses illustrated that this finding is highly relevant for the development of social stratification: The migrant middle class would have shrunk even more had immigration not been Europeanised. 26 However, this process was counteracted by transformations in the labour market, including an increase in part-time employment and the loss of protection from social decline for intermediate qualifications. Thus, a variety of displacement effects are presumed to be developing in the labour market. Furthermore, we showed factors such as education, occupation, gender, age, language skills, and industry affiliation to merely explain a part of the differences between Austrian natives and migrants' class affiliations. This is an important finding and gives rise to the issue of discrimination in Vienna (Sievers et al., 2014) .
In the end, one can assume that the decline of migrants from the middle of Vienna's society is yet another example of an overall European development. Migrants are among those most strongly affected by the financial crisis in Europe (European Commission, 2016) , and is also the case in Vienna, where almost 40% of all unemployed individuals are foreign citizens and almost half of the population of the city has a migrant background (AMS, 2016) .
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